THE INES BIOMETRIC CARD
AND
THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY ASSIGNMENT IN FRANCE
Pierre PIAZZA, Laurent LANIEL
ABSTRACT This paper examines several aspects of the new
and controversial French biometric ID card project called INES (Secure
Electronic National Identity), disclosed by the government in early 2005 and
temporarily suspended a few months later. Firstly, the eventful history of
carding in France is reviewed. Secondly, in order to elicit major similarities
and differences between INES and past projects, the INES project itself is
examined and attention is paid to its design, legitimization by the government,
and decision-making process, which for the first time involved all citizens in
a democratic debate. Finally, the paper turns to the various forms of resistance
to INES, either institutional or stemming from the media and civil society.
These resistances have shed light on the various limitations of the INES
project by criticizing the inappropriateness of its design, the unconvincing
nature of governmental justifications and the potential dangers of biometrics
for civil liberties and the French conception of citizens identity.
Thanks to
historical and sociological research, the material aspects of the
manufacturing of individual identities by the French national authorities are
well-known at present[1]. Indeed,
building on Michel Foucaults initial reflection that the state aspires to
prescribe behaviors conforming with the order that it is endeavoring to impose
through governmental techniques which strengthen its grip on individual
behaviors (1975, 2004), research has shown that the rise of carding[2]
techniques has done much to improve our understanding of the various logics at
play -- control[3], distinction[4],
codification (Bourdieu 1993) and stigmatization[5]
-- in the construction and consolidation of the modern state in connection with
the emergence of the individual in Western society (Elias 1991). Such logics
are manifested by the constant improvement of several types of bureaucratic
knowledge and know-how in carding matters. They inform us of the changing
nature of the concerns (law enforcement, social policy[6],
health policy[7],
etc.), strategies (ranging from official orders to softer, more symbolic forms
of power imposition), and justification discourses through which state
authorities have increased their prerogatives significantly by becoming
involved ever more extensively in the definition and material shaping of
peoples identity. At
present, these state logics undeniably are undergoing a major shift due to the
introduction of biometrics in identity documents. Indeed, the generalized move
toward biometrization of ID papers results in the emergence of new issues,
including the hardening of the control systems applied to international travelers
(Rosecrance, Badie, Hassner 2002: 56 et
passim), the definition of radically new criteria of dangerousness (Bigo
2004)[8],
the transformation of the relations of the state with private security
operators (Ocqueteau 2004), and the protection, at a global level, of the
information stored in ever more extensive computer databases (Ceyhan 2007: 46). By
contrast, although part and parcel of the power politics that lie at the core
of identity assignment processes, resistance to such state undertakings remain mostly
obscure. There are two main reasons for this lack of knowledge. Firstly, archive-based research does
not always allow adequate analysis of the perceptions, practices and
circumventing strategies of the people on whom identification techniques were applied[9].
Secondly, many of the issues surrounding recent biometric identification
methods have yet to be studied in detail[10]. Yet it is indispensable to examine
resistance closely since each carding process should be viewed as a special
type of power struggle between actors that have the power to materially define,
codify and fix an official identity and others who, being the targets of such
identity assignment, are led to dispute its validity periodically. The forms
that these protests take are all-important since they strongly influence the
shape of carding systems, the specific carding path followed by each state
and the type of power politics that emerge between state authorities and the
individuals targeted by identification enterprises (Poirmeur 2006). Resistances
may have different motives and be rooted in politics, law, ethics or culture.
And they may be expressed in a large variety of ways, from individual
circumvention or diversion strategies aimed at avoiding state impositions to
collective protest movements using sophisticated types of rhetoric and action. However, it is always crucial to understand
their historical genesis since the configuration of past power politics
strongly impacts present-day power struggles. This paper is an effort to start
filling the gaps in research by examining one of the main systems that the
French government is presently striving to implement in order to better
identify citizens—the biometric identity card project, INES (Secured
Electronic National Identity). While this requires reviewing the eventful
history of carding in France in order to elicit the projects novel features,
due attention must also be paid to the forms of resistance that it has
triggered, so as to better grasp how they have contributed to shaping the
projects own history. All in all, the INES project is a fine illustration of
the fact that carding, far from being a powerful instrument that a Big
Brother state, bent on opaque and ferocious designs, forces upon an obeying,
helpless and amorphous mass of citizens, is better analyzed as the complex
outcome of a struggle between political power and the social body that it
wishes to rule. CARDING THE FRENCH: AN
EVENTFUL HISTORY In a
little more than a century, France went from a situation where no specific
piece of paper had the monopoly of self-denomination (Offerl 1993: 49) to
the institution of the first Identity Card of the French (carte didentit
de Franais) in one department only in 1921, then to the establishment by
the Vichy regime of another Identity Card of the French in 1940, which failed
to be distributed everywhere in France, and finally to the National Identity
Card (carte nationale didentit) in 1955, which would be computerized
gradually starting in 1987. This expansion of carding has been underpinned by a
double logic—materializing a belonging common to citizens recognized as
equals; and discriminating against some French people viewed as suspects or
enemies of the nation. The First Card Starting
in 1870, the development of bertillonnage and dactyloscopy (Kaluszynski 1987 ; Piazza 2000, 2005b ; About 2004) made it
possible for the authorities to think methodically about the role of
description, photographs and fingerprints as well as the connection that must
exist between these identifiers and the information kept and classified in
state records. At first, these techniques were used to identify with more
certainty some categories of the population viewed as dangerous or
marginal—recidivist offenders, nomads (Asseo
2002; Piazza 2002), and foreigners (Noiriel 1991). However, the entire
French population would soon be subjected to carding. By a circular of
September 12, 1921, Police Prefect Robert Leullier instituted the first
Identity Card of the French, which citizens residing in Paris and the Seine
Department could request. This card became the sole and uniform ID paper issued
to French citizens by the Paris police prefecture and a reference document to
which all other ID papers for citizens had to conform. Leullier
thought that the reform was a step forward since it remedied the diversity of
existing identification practices for nationals, who until then could use a
wide range of documents issued by myriad authorities, none of which was more
important than the others, as proof of their identity[11]. Leullier
added that the card was established in the publics own interest (Valbelle
1921), since it would make it unnecessary to have two witnesses to prove ones
identity – as was required for administrative procedures at that time.
But if this formality was to be done away with, the card had to offer strong
guarantees as to its authenticity. Hence the Paris police resorted to the
Bertillon system. On each card, the individuals description had to be drafted
with utmost precision and the dimensions of the photograph were carefully set
in order to facilitate the owners identification. In addition, the card bore
the fingerprint of its owner. The prefecture would file all the forms filled by
those requesting the card, thereby setting up a centralized record [that] will
make it possible to check whether card number X was indeed issued to individual
Y, with a view to avoiding substitutions (Leullier 1921). Some of
the press supported the card, depicting it as indispensable to put an end to
the problems created by the need for witnesses (La
Rpublique franaise 1921; La Presse
1921a). Some journalists even wanted to out-Herod Herod. For instance,
newspaper La Presse (1921b) explained
that the fingerprint could be useful to identify possible criminals, but
Leullier denied that this was his intention. Yet the
card also attracted suspicion. Discontent focused on fingerprinting, which
assimilated citizens with criminals. Both the right and the left adamantly
rejected the notion that citizens could be identified thanks to techniques used
by the Criminal Record Office against offenders. The communist daily LHumanit (1921) equated the new card
to some sort of criminal record, while the conservative LIntransigeant (1921) compared it with a Bertillon card that would
soon become compulsory for all. While the
problem was all but ignored when the interior ministry (henceforth: the
Interior) had imposed an identity card on foreign residents of France in 1917,
public opinion discovered in 1921 that Leulliers ID card threatened individual
freedom. Leullier would eventually bow to the protest by making his card
non-compulsory. The first Identity Card of the French, which was invented to
rationalize administrative identification procedures, thereby failed to fulfill
its objective since other documents could still prove citizens identity. Vichy In the
context of the suspension of democracy and enhanced technocratization of power,
the Vichy regime (1940-1944) launched its own ID project, which entailed, for
the first time ever, a close partnership between the Interior and state
statistics services. The law
establishing an Identity Card of the French compulsory for all citizens aged
16 and above was published on October 27, 1940 (J.O. 1940: 5740-5741). Issuance of the card started in twelve
departments in 1943. Vichy thereby hoped to preserve the illusion of national
unity (while France was occupied and its territory divided up into several
zones)[12] and
presented the card as proof of its determination to modernize a state it said
had been perverted by the previous regime (Le
Cri du peuple 1940). In fact, although the Vichy carding drive was indeed
novel, it cashed in on the knowledge and know-how accumulated during the
Third Republic. With a
view to forestalling problems arising from the wide range of documents by which
the French could still prove who they were, the model of the Vichy compulsory
card was unique, its dimensions, the type of paper used and the location of the
rubrics it contained were precisely defined by a multitude of Interior-issued
documents—decrees, circulars, orders. For practical reasons, the mayors
were summoned to help deliver the card to citizens by drafting requests and
recording them, but under the supervision of prefectures, which were the only
institutions allowed to manufacture the card. Likewise, by subjecting the
different steps of the distribution process to prefectorial control, Vichy
endeavored to standardize state identification practices and to ensure that
they were carried out in accordance with the uniform rules designed by the
central authority. To make
the card more secure, the police resorted once more to Bertillons inventions
and to fingerprinting. The Interior wanted to set up a central record with a
copy of each card actually issued, but eventually this turned out to be
impossible. In addition, the ministry called on statistics services which invented,
from the data of the registers of births, marriages and deaths, a 13-digit
identification number that made it possible to accurately characterize
individuals during their entire lifetime[13].
That number was embossed on each card, written down on each request form filed
by the prefectures and recorded in a central repertory established by the
statistics services. The Interior thought that this was an efficient means to
identify each requester unequivocally, carry out identity checks rapidly,
detect attempts by one individual to obtain several cards, and identify
counterfeit cards. The symbol
of a new regime embodied in a strong state committed to the emergence of a new
order, the Vichy card also served for the more down-to-earth task of
cleansing the national community, which Vichy planned to regenerate by
excluding the metics (mtques) that
had debased it. The procedures for issuing the cards (starting in 1943)
proved crucial for the segregation policy launched by Vichy as early as 1940.
For instance, the meticulous checks implemented by the prefectures allowed the
Interior to ascertain how each requester had acquired their French nationality,
and then to write this information down on the card. The stamping of the word
Jew on identity cards served to materialize a type of sub-citizenship. This
measure, which was demanded by the German authorities and the Vichy
institutions specializing in hunting Jews, was taken special care of by the
Interior. Furthermore, in 1942 the ministry started distribution of
customs-made punching machines intended to impede any tampering with the Jew
mention on the cards (Piazza 2004: 224-226). In an effort to steer the
evolution of the race by reasoned legislative action on the individuals
conforming it (CAEF), the statistics services even imagined a system to
distinguish between good and bad French people by means of an Individual
Descriptive Book (carnet signaltique
individuel) that would have made it possible to record myriad personal data
(education, physical abilities, professional skills, morality, etc.) about its
holders. However,
several obstacles would come in the way of the rationalized carding of all
French people by the Vichy police. The sheer scope of the identification work
to be carried out, and the division of the country into several zones
complicating the transmission of official documents, made it difficult to
distribute the card throughout France. Then there were material problems such
as the lack of paper and chemicals needed to manufacture the card and the
photographs. The carding project also attracted the hostility of many citizens.
According to Interior reports mentioning psychological resistance, the card
caused concern because of the amount of data it contained, and because it was perceived
as yet another obligation forced upon the people and as a type of
pre-mobilization orchestrated by the Germans. Finally, the acts of resistance
of some civil servants and, especially after the institution of the Compulsory
Work Service (STO) in 1943, the gradual professionalization and expansion (?) of
the counterfeiting of papers by Resistance movements would also frustrate
governmental carding ambitions (Nogures 1984; Wieviorka 1995). After World War II At
Liberation, any type of distinction between citizens was banned. As a result,
the cards bearing the word Jew were withdrawn and the rubric on the method of
acquisition of French nationality was deleted. On October 22nd, 1955
a decree by the interior ministry instituted a National Identity Card, and
explained that this was done in a perfectly liberal spirit (Le Parisien 1955). This new
card was based on a single model for the whole of France and issued by the
prefectures only. It was optional and entailed the creation of not one central record but several departmental records. In
addition, the Interior removed from the card any element that might have lent
it a repressive nature. The mention distinguishing marks and a frontal
photograph replaced the detailed description and the photograph of the right
profile that reminded of criminal identification procedures on the Vichy card.
The 1955 decree required a print of the left index finger on both the card and
the request form, but the Interior eventually waived this requirement in 1974
arguing that it was undeniably a constraint for the public (Intrieur 1974).
While the Interior officially distanced itself from Vichy with the National
Identity Card, one of its unofficial objectives was the control of the French
Moslems of Algeria. A confidential circular by the Interior on December 7,
1955 instituted a specific form of prefectorial control on these citizens on
grounds that possible suspects among them could try to take on false identities[14].
It was not
until the 1970s and an increase in the fear of crime that significant change
emerged—the computerization of the National Identity Card, which gave
rise to a major national debate and even became, for the first time, a bone of
contention between the main political parties. The proposed reform allowed
conservatives to show their determination to fight some threats: crime, illegal
immigration and terrorism. By opposing the reform, the left could claim to be
defending individual freedom against generalized police surveillance. As a
result, the computerized card was the subject of diametrically opposed policies
for years. The first model was made official on July 31st, 1980 by a
decree of the interior minister of a conservative government (J.O. 1980: 1953). In October 1981
– that is, just four months after the election as president of France of
Franois Mitterand, a socialist – an order by the new interior minister
stopped distribution of the card (J.O.
1981: 9065). After the conservative victory at the legislative election of
March 1986, a new Secured National Identity Card was issued by the Chirac
government in the Hauts-de-Seine Department only as of April 1988. However,
following the re-election of Mitterand in May 1988, generalization of the card
would be frozen, and then would start again in the aftermath of the
conservatives landslide at the March 1993 legislative elections. This new
card, which is still in use in 2007 but remains optional, has several specific
features. Physical production is restricted to two centers only in order to
guarantee total standardization of its shape and contents. Several techniques
are used to impede imitations and tampering (security paper, UV-sensitive
elements, lamination, etc.). In addition to physically tamper-proofing the
card, the Interior has set up a National Management Record that is
systematically consulted through a computer terminal in order to ensure that
no-one obtains more than one card. Finally, the ministry has hardened
attribution requirements in an effort to enhance the security of the issuing
phases, but at the detriment of the principle of equality between citizens. The
obligation to show two recent proofs of place of residence to issuing
authorities in order to obtain the card has intensified the marginalization of
homeless citizens (Bresson 1995). Another measure – considering every
request as a first request – affects other categories of citizens,
including those born in France of foreign or naturalized parents and those
married to a foreigner. For several thousands of such people, the authorities
have demanded a certificate of nationality in addition to the birth certificate
with filiations required for all. This practice is strongly resented by these
citizens, indignant to be subjected to routine state xenophobia (Maschino
2002) and treated as second-rate citizens. The French
police carding system has become significantly more sophisticated in recent
years. Yet a major fault remains—the weakness of the controls applied
upstream of the issuance of the card. In spite of everything, it is still
fairly easy to obtain an authentic secured card by providing birth documents
that do not reflect the real identity of the requester. THE
INES PROJECT: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLE? The INES project comes after the Titre fondateur project launched
by socialist Interior Minister Daniel Vaillant in 2000-2001. The Titre fondateur, which was included in
the Pluri-annual Action Plan for the Prefectures 2002-2004, attracted much
criticism (CNIL 2004: 82-84)[15]. The INES project was mentioned for the first time in September 2003 by Interior Minister
Nicolas Sarkozy in his closing address to the fourth Worldwide Forum on
e-Democracy at Issy-les-Moulineaux near Paris. Sarkozy presented the project as
one of the priorities of the Interior and pledged that it would be
operational by 2006. After pilot-experiments were carried out in Gironde
Department, the project was taken up by Sarkozys successor at the Interior,
Dominique de Villepin, who in January 2005 requested the Forum des droits sur
lInternet (FDI 2005)[16] to organize a national debate so that citizens opinions could be taken
into account before the authorities would design the final version of INES.
That version was officially approved by Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin at
the inter-ministerial meeting that adopted the INES Program on April 11, 2005.
The Program was then to become a bill to be subjected to the approval of both
the National Commission on Computers and Liberties (CNIL)[17]
and the State Council[18] before it
would be debated at Parliament and voted into law (Foucart 2005a). The nature of the new carding system INES is truly a revolutionary system for identifying nationals. Indeed,
with a cost estimated at 205 million a year ( 25 million a year more than
the current system), the project involves charging citizens for a biometric
card (the state stopped charging for ID cards in 1998) that would become
compulsory within five years of initial issuing. The optional nature of the
French ID card was decided under the Third Republic, maintained at Liberation
and never questioned by any government thereafter. As far as the centralization of the information on card owners is
concerned, INES is a significant step forward, although centralization has
always been a major objective of efficiency-driven French police forces. For
the first time, the INES card is to be connected to several central records of
nominative data managed by the authorities, namely: A register of births, deaths and marriages, which the Interior intends to
set up from the National Register of Identification of Natural Persons (RNIPP,
which contains names, surnames, filiations, addresses, etc.) managed by the
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE);
- A record containing the fingerprints of card owners;
- A record containing the digitalized facial photographs of card owners;
and
- A record of passport owners[19].
Also novel is the fact that the biometric data contained in the card is
to be saved in a microchip. According to the Interiors The INES Program
(2005), the data held in the chip is to be distributed among five distinct
blocks, unconnected to one another: - An identity block, containing information including the two
fingerprints and the digitalized photograph of the cards owner, which may be
accessed by duly authorized officials only;
- An authentication block, proving the cards authenticity;
- A certified identification block, allowing owners to access public and
private e-procedures;
- An electronic signature block, allowing owners to electronically sign
authentic documents (e-administration); and
- A personal portfolio block, allowing owners to save additional data on
the card (a drivers license number, for instance).
Finally, the biometric data saved in the Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) chip included in the INES card may be accessed remotely without contact
during automated control procedures[20]. Legitimization discourse As far as identity assignment is concerned, the INES project is in many
respects an undeniable break from the past. Conversely, the discursive
strategies implemented by the authorities in order to justify the need for INES
are clearly inherited from past rhetorical efforts aimed at convincing citizens
to agree with a document intended first and foremost to meet the needs of the
state (Piazza 2004: 141-145). The authorities systematically stress the usefulness of the biometric ID
card. Far from a dangerous police tool, it is described as just a convenient
instrument thanks to which citizens will find it easy to prove their identity
and their French nationality in a world defined by increasingly complex social
relations. In this view, INES is supposed to allow citizens to prove their
uniqueness in an undisputable way, and to bring them the satisfaction of it
being recognized at all times while eliminating the disadvantages of identity
usurpation. At certain periods of the past, some supported the idea of turning
the ID card into a fully fledged certificate of respectability.[21]
This notion is not altogether absent in the INES project. Since owners will
have the option of saving many personal details in the portfolio block of
their cards chips, and since it will be possible to use the card for
authentication purposes on both governmental and commercial websites, what
filters through is the notion that the biometric card will make it easy for
everyone to prove their own transparency, to demonstrate that they have
nothing to hide about themselves and that their way of life is in no way
reproachable. In addition to selling the advantages of INES for the citizens
themselves, the state also presents the card as indispensable to improve the
efficiency of law enforcement. In this case, the legitimization of the INES
project is in line with arguments deployed in the 1970s, when the authorities
used to link the need to computerize the National Identity Card with the fight
against illegal immigration and terrorism. The new biometric card is also said
to make it impossible for foreigners to falsely claim French nationality. This,
in turn, is supposed to help fight against state benefits fraud, tax evasion,
etc., which cost several hundred million euro, according to Interior
guess-estimates (2005). As the prime minister himself insisted on his offices
website, this is a major security problem for our territory and our fellow
citizens, and an especially important issue in the fight against irregular
immigration (Villepin). Additionally, because the biometric card addresses
identity fraud the authorities present it as an anti-terrorist weapon. The
Interior has thus claimed that identity fraud is associated with all types of
serious crime, from terrorism to drug trafficking and the trade in human
beings (Canepa 2005). Such fraud is depicted as a major threat to state
security since terrorists take advantage of the holes in our present systems
in order to evade checks (Villepin 2005b). However, while the present government has been content with recycling
justifications that were formalized years ago, it has connected them to a new
type of argument in an effort to convince the public that the INES project
makes sense—the need to abide by international obligations, which, it is
alleged, force France to implement a biometric carding system. The decision-making process Before INES, no consultation of the public about national carding systems
had ever been organized by French authorities. Carding systems had always been
established and ruled by decrees, orders, and circulars issued by the Interior.
Parliament began to deal with the issue at a late stage and only through rare
and brief exchanges between deputies at the occasion of debates on the
different laws governing ID checks that were voted in the 1980s. In carding
matters, democratic debates were always initiated and carried out by the press,
which either stigmatized the authoritarian nature of carding procedures for
French nationals, or conversely presented them as absolute security
necessities. When the first plans for computerizing the national ID card
emerged in the late 1970s, these arguments gradually overlapped with the
right/left political divide. At the same period, new players began to
participate in the heated debates triggered by computerization plans, including
the CNIL, trade unions, and human rights NGOs. Against this background, Interior Minister Villepins decision to ask the
FDI to organize a national public consultation on the INES project is literally
unheard of in France. Between February 1st and June 7, 2005, the
quasi-governmental organization set up an online forum where every specific
detail of INES was discussed. With a total of 3,060 messages posted by participants,
the Forum was a great success. Moreover, the six live debates orchestrated in
the cities of Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Paris, and Rennes between March
8 and June 16, 2005, were attended by a total of 600 people. Finally, the FDI
commissioned an opinion poll on INES which involved a 950-people representative
sample of the French population. These initiatives undeniably have contributed
to improve public knowledge about INES while providing an opportunity for many
people to express their views, including civil servants, elected officials,
experts, NGO leaders, and common citizens. Another initiative also has helped raise awareness of INES among the
general public. Of its own authority, the CNIL decided to hold a series of
hearings on the INES project in order to be better prepared when the Interior
eventually would request its opinion officially. The hearings took place
between February and May 2005 and enabled the CNIL to consult with people from
many different walks of life (scholars, police officers, magistrates, and
activists) and all testimonies were posted online (CNIL 2005). Finally, for the
first time in France, legislators set up an information-gathering commission
dealing specifically and exclusively with ID issues. The Information Commission
of the Senate Commission on Legislation on the New Generation of Identity
Documents and Documentary Fraud headed by Senators Charles Gun and Jean-Ren
Lecerf of the majority UMP party has started thinking seriously about the use
of biometric ID documents and especially the INES project. The commissions
report published in June 2005 (Lecerf 2005) is a significant contribution to
the democratic debate on INES. RESISTANCE STALLS PROJECT The INES project has attracted harsh
criticism since its inception. This explains why Nicolas Sarkozy, who was
appointed interior minister for the second time at that period, decided to
temporarily suspend the implementation of INES. Here is how Sarkozy (2005)
justified the freeze: This project has evolved a great deal
in the last months. It is going to have a profound, durable impact on the daily
lives of French people. While decisions at the European level force us to
implement a biometric passport in the short term, it is not the case as far as
the electronic ID card is concerned. Therefore, I do not wish to launch into it
without taking the time needed to ponder all of its consequences. The point is
not to back-pedal on some necessary changes but to correctly ascertain what
direction we want to take, under what conditions and at what price. The opposition: Varied forms, multiple actors The FDI-organized debates provided
project detractors with ample opportunity for expression. The FDI final report
(2005) has reflected the scope of public condemnation, which was also largely
commented on in the main newspapers—Le
Monde: Criticism rains on biometric ID project (Foucart 2005c); Libration: FDI tells Interior of
French fears (Tourancheau 2005b); Le
Figaro: Interior embarrassed by biometrics (Tabet & Leclerc 2005); LHumanit: Electronic ID: try again!
(Mouloud 2005). The rise of other forms of
opposition also appears to have influenced Sarkozys decision. INES was
vehemently denounced by defenders of individual liberties. For instance, a
Group for the withdrawal of the INES project was set up in the spring of
2005. This partnership involving five non-governmental organizations and trade
unions launched a website – http://www.ines.sgdg.org –
intended to raise public awareness of what it called the dangers of INES. The website contains a
detailed description of the French biometric ID card project as well as
information on a range of initiatives from several European governments aiming
to include biometric data in travel and identity documents. In May 2005 the
Group launched a petition against INES, mocking it as Inepte, Nocif,
Effrayant, Sclrat (literally: Inept, Harmful, Scary, Nefarious). As of
February 8, 2007, 6,871 individuals and 71 associations and groups had signed
this petition. Additionally, prominent individuals in the Group have explained
why they oppose INES at Senate and CNIL hearings. Pices et main doeuvre (PMO)[22],
a group of individual critics of freedom destroying CC-TV, nanotechnologies
and biometrics also has manifested its hostility to INES. PMO is said to have
orchestrated the June 2005 Libertys hoax (Foucart 2005b; Le Hir & Cabret
2005). A fake four-page leaflet bearing the logo of the Isre General Council
(governing assembly of the Isre Department) was slipped in thousands of
mailboxes in Grenoble. To better denounce INES, the well-imitated,
official-looking leaflet sang the praises of an imaginary new biometric life
card and urged Isre dwellers to request it at once. Meanwhile, INES was the
target of a biting denunciation campaign at the hands of several key internet
activists like Samizdat and Indymedia, while others – e.g. Collectif
contre la biomtrie[23], Brigades
des Clowns[24]
– stigmatized the biometric card as law-and-order oriented. Yet resistance to INES is not
restricted to activists. Opposition also comes from institutional players. In
June 2005, four Communist deputies and senators issued a statement against
INES, while the Socialist Party denounced it on its website[25].
The CNIL, although it has not been officially consulted, has also been
reluctant about INES. Its vice-chairman, Franois Giquel, voiced doubts on the
real intentions behind the interior ministrys biometric ID plan by asking: Does
the INES project consist in identifying owners of a document or does it consist
in identifying unknown individuals from a criminal police perspective?
(Tourancheau 2005a). CNIL Chairman Alex Trk (2005) made it a point to stress
that if the CNIL were called to give an opinion on INES it would do so in
terms of proportionality by taking into account four criteria: centralization
of nominative data; individuals traceability; presence of a security
imperative; and individual consent. This amounts to a thinly-veiled warning
that the CNIL resents a project that it deems is not in sync with its own
doctrine on citizen identification. This doctrine had already been made quite
clear to the Interior when INES was initially floated in 2003: In its deliberation of October 21st,
1986 the Commission gave a favorable opinion on the recording of individuals
fingerprints when they request an ID card, but it did so after duly noting that
no manual, mechanical or automated centralized record of fingerprints would be
created at national level, and that the fingerprints stored in the departmental
records would not be digitalized. Furthermore, the Commission specified its
doctrine during its deliberation of April 24, 2003 on the immigration bill by
stating that it is warranted to use biometric systems in order to make sure of
a persons identity as long as the biometric datum is kept on a medium reserved
exclusively for the use of the person concerned, by contrast, due to the
characteristics of the selected physical element of identification [i.e. digitalized
fingerprints] and of the possible uses to which the databases that could
thereby be created may lend themselves, the storage and processing of
fingerprint data must be justified by compelling security or public order
necessities. In this respect, it must be stressed that the initial decree of
October 22nd, 1955 states that an ID card certifying the identity
of its owner is created but does not mention any public order purpose [] As a
result, the reasons given [by the Interior] do not appear to be sufficient in
view of the potential dangers inherent to the creation of a national database
containing the fingerprints of all ID cards owners. There could be ground
already for the Commission to express its reservations on principle to the
interior ministry by stating again what it stated in 1986 and especially in
2003. In any case, the purposes of the storage of the fingerprints and
therefore of the checking of both the card and the data stored in the microchip
that it contains should be clearly specified, since the creation of centralized
databases interconnected by an identifier represents a fundamental change in
how identity has been thought of in France until now. (CNIL
2003) Another form of institutional
opposition has focused on the design of the INES project itself. The interunion
committee of INSEE and all major national trade-unions – CGT, CFDT,
CGT-FO, SUD and CFTC – have rejected a measure by which INSEE would be
required to certify, through the RNIPP, the birth and marriages documents shown
by citizens requesting the biometric card[26].
According to the unions, this type of activity does not fall within INSEEs
competence and could lead to it becoming a police auxiliary. Meanwhile, the
Association of the Mayors of France (AMF) has condemned the Interiors proposal
of issuing the biometric card in a few hundred French towns only. AMF has said
that, if implemented, this option would force many citizens to travel long
distances to obtain the card and therefore would lead to new territorial inequalities
within France. AMF also has expressed concern about the financial cost of the
INES project for the town councils since the central government would pay only
for the technical, not labor, expenditures required to issue the new card
(Crouzillacq 2005). New Opposition Discourses In addition to these opponents who
condemn specific aspects of INES, others have found fault more generally with
the efficiency of the biometric technology selected by the authorities.
Supported by expert opinion[27], many have
questioned the infallibility of the high-tech card, concluding that as far as
the security of identification procedures is concerned, the benefits that may
result from implementing INES would be minor compared to the considerable
financial cost of the system. Moreover, the methods used by the Interior to
promote its project were criticized. The ministry was suspected of turning the
national consultation organized by the FDI into a decoy essentially intended to
legitimize pre-existing governmental options. Many of the participants in the
FDI internet debate complained that the INES project was approved by Prime
Minister Raffarin in April 2005 while the online consultation supposed to guide
governmental choices was scheduled to end in June. Some of the arguments used to sell INES as a
security imperative were denounced as unconvincing. For instance, the Interior
argued that more compelling individual identification procedures were
indispensable to curb documentary fraud. Yet the scope of such fraud has never been
assessed seriously in France. The only statistics ever quoted by the Interior
in this respect applied to foreign countries, like the US and the UK, where
official citizen identification systems differ widely from those existing in
France[28].
The ministry also failed to convince doubters when it insisted that the
biometric ID card is an important anti-terrorist tool. The FDI final report
thus asked: Will such a system really make it possible to identify first-time
terrorists? How would it keep someone determined to commit a terrorist attack
from obtaining an ID card quite legally? (FDI 2005: 6). Finally, the
contention that France had to conform to supranational norms on identification
was often perceived as a clever attempt to justify a project liable to
attract much resistance. While Interior Minister Villepin declared that the
biometric ID card would be issued before the end of 2006 in accordance with
our European commitments and as agreed with our American friends (J.O.
2005), INES detractors
have repeated ceaselessly that the E.U. Council Regulation of December 13, 2004
on the introduction of biometrics into passports had nothing to do with
national ID cards—Article 1 (3) of the regulation reads: This Regulation applies to passports and travel documents
issued by Member States. It does not apply to identity cards issued by Member
States to their nationals or to temporary passports and travel documents having
a validity of 12 months or less. (E.U. 2004: L 385/2) Additionally, INES opponents have
argued that the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO)[29]
on biometric identification only made it compulsory to use a digitalized
photograph, not fingerprints, in identity documents. For instance, Meryem
Marzouki (2005) of IRIS has criticized the official legitimization discourse of
INES in the following terms: To present as an obligation forced upon the country the implementation
of international or regional political decisions to which France has
contributed, sometimes as a leading force, amounts to what some
non-governmental organizations have termed political laundering. However, most of the blame put on
INES ultimately has revolved around a major fear: the colonization of the
intimate sphere by governmental power, which is accused of developing
increasingly intrusive and tyrannical methods of intervention leading to an
intensification of social control. In this respect, the fears triggered by INES
are in keeping with those that exacerbated in 1921, when the Identity Card of the
French project was denounced as an extension of police records to honest
citizens, considerably restricting individual freedom, and again in the 1980s
by opponents to the computerization of the National Identity Card. However, in the case of INES, the concerns
traditionally articulated along the lines of security imperatives vs.
protection of the private sphere (Guerrier 2004: 21-23) have shifted. New
fears have emerged because of the technologies now available, of the nature of
usable identifiers – which fix individual identity more than ever
before –, and of the fact that identification drives have become
increasingly internationalized. These fears are not only about centralized,
potentially inter-connectable, mega-records of biometric data, but above all
about the rise of a logic of individual traceability[30]
potentially leading to a significant expansion of the control prerogatives
assigned to police organizations while radically threatening the anonymity of
public space and right to oblivion. Epilogue At the time of writing (July 2007),
the future of the INES project is shrouded in mystery [this is still the case in September 2011]. No official statement
about it has been made since its suspension in June 2005, nor since the
presidential election of May 2007. Unofficial rumors about the French
biometric ID card system have filtered through from the Interior, but
have been contradictory. At first, that is, before the presidential election,
it was said that the INES project was being redesigned into a new version that
would be more likely to be adopted. Yet since the election of Nicolas Sarkozy
as president, a well-informed source has indicated that the project would be
presented again to parliament in its original form (i.e. not redesigned) in
2008.
Whatever the case, it may be deduced
that the INES project is not a priority for the new government, for if it was
Sarkozy would most probably have taken advantage of his post-electoral state
of grace period[31] and
majority in parliament to see it voted into law quickly. Instead, it seems that
the new president prefers to use the state of grace to promote other, more
sweeping, and even structural, measures like reforming universities, social
security, the tax system, labor laws, and criminal justice. It may be
also speculated that the new leader perceives INES as strategically risky.
Indeed, the biometric ID card could be an issue around which a presently
extremely weak and divided left-wing opposition may unite, just when Sarkozy is
endeavoring to divide it further by co-opting some of its prominent members
into his new government. As was mentioned earlier, the Left has been opposed to
the carding projects promoted by the Conservatives since the 1970s. Pushing
INES through parliament at this time could jeopardize the support that the new
president is striving to muster up across the board for his reforms. An
additional factor is that the legislative elections of June 2007 were not as
favorable as the new president expected (his UMP party lost seats to the
socialists, although the UMP retains the majority at the national assembly). It
would nonetheless be very surprising if the INES project did not resurface in
2008 or later. Indeed although it is not crucial, INES nonetheless seems to fit
in well with the tough stance against crime and terrorism that Sarkozy has
taken. And of course, there is considerable industrial potential in the
biometric ID card. REFERENCES About, I., 2004, Les fondations dun systme national didentification
policire en France (1893-1914). Anthropomtrie, signalements, fichiers, Genses, No. 54, March. Anderson, B., 1999, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised
edition, London, Verso. Asso, H., 2002, La gendarmerie et lidentification des nomades
(1870-1914) in Luc J.-N., Gendarmerie, tat et socit au xixe, Paris, Publications
de la Sorbonne. Bayle (colonel, government commissioner at the
first Paris War Council), 1922, words pronounced at the session of the Socit
gnrale des prisons of December 1921, Revue pnitentiaire et de droit pnal,
No. 1-3, January-March. Berlire, J.-M. & Lvy, R.,
2001, Les techniques de contrle et leurs mutations, in Blanc-Chalard, M.C. et
al., 2001, Police et migrants. France 1667-1939, Rennes, Presses
universitaires de Rennes. Bigo, D., 2004, La logique du visa Schengen
comme mise distance des trangers et les projets de recours la
biomtrie , international symposium Lidentification des personnes. Gense dun travail dՃtat ,
Paris, EHESS, 30 September/1st October.
Bonditti, P., 2005, Biomtrie et matrise des
flux : vers une go-technopolis du vivant-en-mobilit ?, Cultures et Conflits, No. 58. Bourdieu, P., 1993,
Esprit dՃtat. Gense et structure du champ bureaucratique, Actes de la
recherche en sciences sociales, n 96-97, March. Bresson, M., 1995, Sans-adresse-fixe. Sans-domicile-fixe. Rflexion sur une
sociologie des assists, Revue franaise des affaires sociales, No.
2-3, April-September. CAEF (Centre for Economic and
Financial Archives), note confidentielle,
B55358, undated.
Canepa, D., (General secretary of
the interior ministry), 2005, message on the Forum des droits sur lInternet,
February 1st. http://www.foruminternet.org/forums/read.php?f=16&i=2&t=2 Ceccaldi, P., (deputy), 1917, Bill to make
effective the institution of an identity card, Chambre des dputs, document
parlementaire, J.O., No.
2895, January 19. Ceyhan, A., 2005, Comment prouver lidentit
dun individu ? La preuve par les nouvelles technologies, Revue de la Gendarmerie nationale, No.
217, December. Ceyhan, A., 2007, Enjeux didentification et
de surveillance lheure de la biomtrie, Cultures et conflits, n 64,
February. CNIL (Commission nationale informatique et liberts),
2003, Procs-verbal de la runion du mardi 9 dcembre 2003 (adopt le jeudi 12
fvrier 2004), CNIL, Paris. CNIL,
2004, 24e rapport
dactivit 2003, Paris, La documentation franaise. CNIL, 2005, Carte didentit lectronique : la CNIL au cur dun dbat de
socit majeur, February 18. http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=1772&news[uid]=235&cHash=4bcd24b58e Craipeau, S.,
Dubey, G. & Guchet, X., 2003, La
biomtrie : usages et reprsentations, report on behalf of the Groupe
des coles des Tlcommunications. Crettiez, X. & Piazza, P.
(eds.), 2006, Du papier la biomtrie.
Identifier les individus, Paris, Les presses de Science po. Crouzillacq,
P., 2005, Les maires de France sopposent au projet de carte didentit
lectronique, June 10, retrieved on July 25, 2005 from http://www.01net.com/outils/imprimer.php?article=280984.
Denis, V., 2003, Individu, identit et identification en
France, 1715-1815, Ph.D. thesis (history), Universit Paris-1 (forthcoming
at Champvallon publishers). Denis, V., 2004, Papiers didentit et
respectabilit. Lexemple des indigents dans la France dAncien Rgime, paper
at the symposium Lidentification des personnes. Gense dun travail dՃtat, Paris, EHESS, September 30 / October 1st.
EHESS, 2004, symposium Lidentification des personnes. Gense dun travail dՃtat, Paris,
Septembre 30 / October 1st. E.U.
(European Union), 2004, Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December
2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel
documents issued by Member States, Official Journal of the European
Union, December 29, retrieved on February 7, 2007 from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_385/l_38520041229en00010006.pdf. FDI (Forum des droits sur lInternet), 2005, Rapport. Projet de carte nationale
didentit lectronique, June 16, retrieved on June 20, 2005, from http://www.foruminternet.org/telechargement/documents/rapp-cnie-20050616.pdf. Foucart, S., 2005a, Feu vert pour la carte
didentit lectronique, Le Monde, April 13. Foucart, S., 2005b, Libertys : Aucun
problme si lon a rien se reprocher, Le Monde, June 11. Foucart, S., 2005c, Vent de critiques sur le
projet de carte didentit biomtrique, Le
Monde, June 16. Foucault, M., 1975, Surveiller et punir, Paris,
Gallimard-Seuil. Foucault, M., 2004, Scurit, territoire, population. Cours
au collge de France (1977-1978), Paris, Gallimard-Seuil. France Soir, 2005, interview with Dominique de
Villepin (Interior minister), April 12. Fumaroli, S., 2002, La France prpare une
carte didentit lectronique, 01net, February 11. http://www.01net.com/article/176211.html?rub= Genses,
1993, Lidentification, No. 13, Fall. Genses, 2004,
Vos papiers !, No. 54, March. Guerrier, C., 2004, Les cartes didentit et
la biomtrie : lenjeu scuritaire, revue
mensuelle du JurisClasseur-Communication-Commerce lectronique, May. Intrieur (Interior Ministry), 1974,
Circulaire n 74-555 du 24 octobre 1974,
Archives de la prfecture de Police de Paris, DB 109, October 24.
Intrieur (General Secretariat,
Direction of the INES Program), 2005, Le
programme INES, January 31st, retrieved on December 2005 from
J.O. (Official Gazette), 1940, November 20. J.O. (Official Gazette), 1980, August2nd.
J.O. (Official Gazette), 1981, October 10. J.O. (Official
Gazette) 2005, Rponse du ministre de lIntrieur une question
parlementaire pose par le dput UMP Thierry Mariani, No. 0068, Paris, March
22nd. Kaluszynski, M., 1981, Alphonse Bertillon,
savant et policier. Lanthropomtrie ou le dbut du fichage, M.A. thesis
(history), Universit Paris-7. Kaluszynski, M., 1987, Alphonse Bertillon et lanthropomtrie in Vigier P., & Faure, A. (eds.),
1987, Maintien de lordre et polices en France et en Europe au XIXe sicle,
Paris, Craphis. La Presse,
1921a, Un mtier disparat. Cest celui du tmoin complaisant, September 3. La Presse, 1921b, Le Bertillonnage pour
tous !, September 7. La Rpublique franaise, 1921, Tmoins patents, September 4. Lecerf, J-R., 2005, Senate Information Report
Identit intelligente et respect des liberts, J.O., No. 439, June 29, retrieved on
July 22nd, 2006 from http://www.senat.fr/rap/r04-439/r04-439.html
Le Cri du peuple, 1940, Carte de Franais, cest autrement srieux que la carte
dՎlecteur, November 26. Le Hir, P. & Cabret, N., 2005, Des
activistes grenoblois contre les ncrotechnologies, Le Monde, June
16. Le Parisien,
1955, partir du 1er janvier, une nouvelle carte didentit,
October 28. Leullier, R., 1921, Depuis quatre mois quil exerce ses fonctions, M. Robert
Leullier, Prfet de police, a ralis immdiatement des rformes pratiques,
Leullier interviewed in the daily Excelsior,
September 4. LHumanit, 1921, La carte didentit, September
13. LIntransigeant, 1921, Veut-on nous imposer
lanthropomtrie ?, September 8. Marzouki, M., 2005, La loi informatique et
liberts de 1978 2004 : du scandale pour les liberts une culture de
la scurit, paper presented at the symposium Informatique : servitude ou liberts ? organised by CNIL,
Paris, November 7-8, retrieved on February 6, 2007 from http://www-polytic.lip6.fr/article.php3?id_article=95. Maschino, M., 2002, tes-vous sr dՐtre Franais ?, Le Monde diplomatique, June. Mouloud, L., 2005, Identit
lectronique : il faut revoir la copie !, LHumanit, June 17. Nogures, H., 1984, Sous la rsistance,
scurit et faux papiers, Historia, No. 448, March. Noiriel, G., 1988, Le creuset franais. Histoire de limmigration, XIXe-XXe sicle, Paris, Seuil. Noiriel, G., 1991, La Tyrannie du national. Le droit dasile en Europe,
1793-1993, Paris, Calmann-Lvy. Noiriel, G. 2005,
Les pratiques policires didentification des migrants et leurs enjeux pour
lhistoire des relations de pouvoir. Contribution une rflexion en longue
dure, in Piazza 2005a. Ocqueteau, F.,
2004, Polices entre tat et march, Paris, Les presses de Science po. Offerl, M., 1993, LՎlecteur et ses papiers. Enqute sur les cartes et listes
lectorales (1838-1939), Genses, No. 13, Fall. Piazza, P., 2000, La fabrique
bertillonienne de lidentit. Entre violence physique et symbolique, Labyrinthe, No. 6. Piazza, P., 2002, Au cur de la
construction de lՃtat moderne. Linvention du carnet anthropomtrique des
nomades, Les Cahiers de la Scurit
intrieure, No. 48, second quarter. Piazza, P., 2004, Histoire de la carte nationale didentit,
Paris, Odile Jacob. Piazza, P. (ed.), 2005a, Police et
identification. Enjeux, pratiques, techniques, Les Cahiers de la
scurit, No. 56, first quarter. Piazza, P., 2005b, Alphonse Bertillon face la dactyloscopie. Nouvelle
technologie policire didentification et trajectoire bureaucratique, Les
Cahiers de la scurit, No. 56, first quarter. Poirmeur, Y., 2006,
Entre logique didentification et rsistance identitaire in Crettiez &
Piazza, 2006. Politix, 2006, Impostures, No. 74, June. Rosecrance, R., Badie, B. & Hassner, P.,
2002, Dbat sur lՃtat virtuel, Paris, Les presses de Science po. Sarkozy, N., 2005, Discours devant les Prfets prononc au ministre de lIntrieur, June
25, Paris. Spire, A., 2005, trangers la carte. Ladministration de limmigration en
France (1945-1975), Paris, Grasset. Tabet, M.-C. & Leclerc, J.-M., 2005 La
biomtrie embarrasse lIntrieur, Le Figaro, June 17.
Torny, D., 1999, La traabilit comme technique de gouvernement des hommes
et des choses, Les Cahiers
de la scurit intrieure, No. 38, first quarter. Tourancheau, P., 2005a, La nouvelle carte
didentit met la puce loreille de la CNIL, Libration, April 21st.
Tourancheau, P., 2005b, Le Forum des droits
sur lInternet a relay auprs de lIntrieur les inquitudes des Franais,
Libration, June 17.
Trk, A., 2005, speech at the sixth Worldwide
Forum on Electronic Democracy (eGov), Issy-les-Moulineaux, September 29. Universit Toulouse-1, 2005, symposium Nomination, tat civil, identit, April
5/6. Valbelle, R., 1921, Dans tous les
commissariats de police de Paris, on a commenc tablir les nouvelles cartes
didentit, Excelsior, September 15. Villepin, D., (Prime minister), words written
on the French governments internet portal, http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/mobile.php3?id_article=52305 Villepin, D., 2005a (Interior
minister), Letter to the president of the Forum des droits sur lInternet to
request the organisation of an online debate on the INES project, January 6,
retrieved on February 7, 2007 from http://www.foruminternet.org//telechargement/forum/lttre-mission-cnie.pdf Villepin, D., 2005b (Interior minister), J.O.,
Assemble nationale, March 22.
Wieviorka, O., 1995, Une certaine
ide de la rsistance. Dfense de la France, 1940-1949, Paris, Seuil. Wolf, P., 2003, De lauthentification
biomtrique, Scurit Informatique,
No. 46, October, retrieved on February 7, 2007 from http://www.sg.cnrs.fr/FSD/securite-systemes/revues-pdf/num46.pdf. FRENCH ACRONYMS USED IN THIS CHAPTER AMF: Association des Maires de France
(Association of the Mayors of France)
CAC: Centre des Archives Contemporaines
(Center for Contemporary Archives)
CAEF: Centre des archives conomiques et financires (Center for Economic and Financial
Archives) CFDT: Confdration Franaise Dmocratique du
Travail (Democratic French Labor Con-federation)
CFTC: Confdration Franaise des Travailleurs
Chrtiens (French Confederation of Christian Workers)
CGT: Confdration Gnrale du Travail
(General Labor Confederation)
CGT-FO: Confdration Gnrale du Travail-Force
Ouvrire (General Labor Confederation-Workers Force)
CNIL: Commission Nationale Informatique et
Liberts (National Commission on Computers and Liberties)
FDI: Forum des Droits sur lInternet (Internet
Rights Forum)
INES: Identit Nationale lectronique Scurise
(Secured Electronic National Identity) INSEE: Institut National de la Statistique et des
tudes conomiques (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies)
IRIS: Imaginons un Rseau Internet Solidaire
(Lets Imagine a Solidarity-based Internet Network)
J.O.: Journal
Officiel (Official Gazette)
RNIPP: Registre National dIdentification des
Personnes Physiques (National Register of Identification of Physical
Persons)
STO: Service du Travail Obligatoire (Compulsory Work Service) SUD: Solidaires, Unitaires, Dmocratiques
(Interdependent, Unitarian, Democratic -- labor union)
UMP: Union pour
un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Peoples Movement -- political party)
A slightly different version of this paper was published in Colin J. Bennett and David Lyon (eds) (2008), Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, security and identification in global perspective, Routledge, London & New York
[1] Kaluszynski (1981), Noiriel (1988), Berlire & Levy (2001), Denis (2003), Genses (1993, 2004), Piazza (2005a), EHESS (2004), Universit Toulouse 1 (2005), Spire (2005), Crettiez & Piazza (2006).
[2] We use the term carding to refer to the
process by which the identity of individuals is codified and written down on
official papers carried by individuals, these papers being connected to records
held by state authorities.
[3] On the gradual transition from a police
surveillance activity relying on face-to-face recognition procedures to the
indirect, remote , methods for controlling individuals that
emerged with the development of the nation-state, see Noiriel (2005).
[4] In order to be imagined as both inherently
limited and sovereign (Anderson 1999 : 6), the national community must
take on concrete dimensions, which the state helps bring into effective and
visible existence. This is achieved especially through carding procedures,
which by establishing a clear distinction between citizens and foreigners
facilitate the embedding in daily social practice of a nation-statal logic
underpinned by inclusion and exclusion imperatives, as most papers in this
volume illustrate.
[5] See
especially Goffmans Stigma
(1975), which touches on the question of the connection between personal
identity and identity documents.
[6] Breckenridges paper on the South African HANIS system in this volume is an illustration.
[7] See Maass paper on the European Health Insurance Card in this volume.
[8] Also see Mullers paper on the biometric state in this volume.
[9] This is not to say that such analysis is
downright impossible; see especially Denis (2004) and the papers published in a
recent issue of the journal Politix (2006) on Impostures.
[10] On the reactions triggered by the use of
biometrics in schools, see Craipeau, Dubey & Guchet (2003).
[11] Identity, good character, residence, and birth
certificates; family record books; military cards; hunting licenses; cards
issued by railways; etc.
[12] Nonetheless, Vichy often had to deal with the
occupant, which deemed the card to be necessary to preserve order and keep the
population under police surveillance.
[13] This is the forerunner of the Social Security
number presently used in France.
[14] This circular may be consulted at the Centre
des archives contemporaines (CAC, at Fontainebleau) under reference number
860 580 art.7.
[15] With the Titre fondateur, the Interior hoped
to rationalise bureaucratic practices so that citizens may obtain safer ID and
travel documents through a single and simplified procedure. In addition, each
French citizen was to be ascribed a single identification number (printed on
both ID and travel documents) allowing them to carry out administrative
procedures on the internet, since the number was to serve as both a signature for online exchanges with the state and a personal
access key to administrative data (Fumaroli 2002).
[16] The Internet Rights Forum is a
quasi-governmental organisation set up by the prime minister in December 2000
in order to organise debates on the legal and social issues arising from the
internet and new technologies.
[17] Founded by the law of January 6, 1978, the
CNIL is an independent administrative authority protecting privacy and personal
data.
[18] The Conseil dՃtat (or State Council) is
Frances highest administrative court; its main role is to give opinions on the
legality of governmental bills, decrees and ordinances.
[19] In the mid-term, the Interior would like to
merge procedures for obtaining the biometric ID card and the biometric
passport.
[20] On use of RFID technology for identification purposes, see Stanton, Chango & Owens in this volume.
[21] By writing owners criminal records down on
the cards (Ceccaldi 1917), or by describing the state of owners military
obligations (Bayle 1922: 29).
[23] In November 2005, some members of this group
destroyed biometric terminals in a high-school near Paris. They were sentenced
by court to suspended prison and a heavy fine on February 17, 2006.
[24] Inspired from the British movement CIRCA
(Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army), several clown brigades have emerged
in France since 2005.
[26] See the leaflet issued on June 7, 2005 on: http://cgtinsee.free.fr/dossiers/libertes/ines/Tract%20Intersyndical%20INES%20INSEE%207%20juin%202005.pdf).
[27] Especially Philippe Wolf (2003), head of
training at the Central Direction of Information Systems Security of the prime
ministers office, who exposed the numerous weaknesses of biometric technology
in his paper On Biometric Authentication.
[28] On the difficulty to assess fraud, see Ceyhan
(2005: 7-8).
[29] On ICAO, see Stanton, Chango & Owens in this volume.
[30] On traceability, see e.g. Torny (1999),
Bonditti (2005). Many critics have stressed that inclusion of a contact-free
chip within the INES card would allow to read chip data from a remote location
without the consent or knowledge of the card carrier.
[31] In France, lՎtat de grace is the
name given to the period following an election, especially a presidential
election, during which the newly elected official enjoys exceptional popularity
ratings. It may last for several months and has often been taken advantage of
by new incumbents to promote measures previously thought of as unpopular or
otherwise politically risky.